We study the role of labor market institutions and policies in affecting the wage impact of immigration using a cross-country meta-analysis approach. We gather information on 1,548 previously reported semi-elasticities from 66 academic studies covering 20 developed countries. We supplement this dataset with country-level institutional structure and coverage data from the OECD. These include employment and wage rigidities, labor mobility, active labor market programs spending, and product market regulation. We relate estimated wage effects and institutional coverage while controlling for local economic conditions, immigrant skill composition, time and region fixed effects and study characteristics. Higher labor market rigidity, as brought about by more widespread institutions, regulations and policies, mitigates the effects on relative wages of high-versus low-skilled natives but exacerbates the impacts on average earnings. Overall, our results suggest that labor market institutions and policies may be effective tools in the economic absorption of foreign workers.
Introduction
Institutional structures and policies such as collective bargaining, unemployment insurance and active labor market policies play a key role in most interactions in the labor market (Nickell and Layard, 1999; Boeri and Van Ours, 2013) . As such, their origins and consequences have been intense objects of analysis by economists for more than a century (e.g., Moore, 1911) . More recently, labor economists have focused on studying the interplay between these structures and other economic phenomena. Examples include the interaction of institutions and policies with the effect of minimum wage (Neumark and Wascher, 2004) , the returns to education (Webber, 2014) , income inequality (Farber et al., 2018) and wage determination (Nunziata, 2005) where researchers have documented significant synergies.
A specific aspect of the labor market where institutions may be particularly crucial, and yet are understudied, is the competition between native and foreign workers. Institutions are often meant to protect incumbent native born from workplace competition with foreign labor. Specifically, policy-induced labor market imperfections and rigidities may serve as a preventive factor for wage and employment adjustments. In fact, demand for such protection policies may endogenously arise from public pressure towards politicians due to increased migration levels (Rodrik, 1997) . Following a supply shock, well-designed policies would provide a smooth transition back into market equilibrium, mitigating any potentially negative impacts caused by foreign workers.
While a large body of literature analyzes the wage and employment consequences of immigration,
we know little about their interaction with labor market policies and institutions. The classic theoretical underpinnings of the literature rest on assuming perfectly competitive markets, entirely ignoring any such synergies (e.g., Borjas, 2013) . This interplay is of particular relevance because policies and institutions may aid in absorbing foreign workers whilst minimally disrupting the labor market. The substantial returns to improved policies are highlighted by few recent polls suggesting immigration is the top issue among election voters in Europe and the U.S. (European Commission, 2018; Reuters, 2018) .
Two major challenges stand in the way of measuring the role of institutions on the wage impact of foreign-born workers. First, institutions are generally set on a national level and do not vary within countries, so a thorough analysis requires a cross-country perspective. Labor markets across the developed world vary greatly in terms of mobility, rigidity, and institutional scope and intensity providing a useful laboratory to study how labor market institutions and policies affect the consequences and absorption of immigrants. Second, gathering comparable micro data across a wide set of countries and time periods is a virtually unattainable task. We circumvent both issues by directly relating estimated cross-country immigration wage effects and institution scope, enabling us to carefully isolate their relationship. Along the way we show economic theory is compatible with a wide range of scenarios, motivating the empirical assessment of these interactions.
We study how labor market institutions and policies affect the impact of immigration on natives' wages utilizing a cross-country meta-analytic approach. To accomplish this, we gather a novel database covering 1,548 estimates on the wage impacts of foreign workers from 66 published academic articles spanning 20 countries in the developed world and several decades. We supplement this database with Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data on country-specific labor market institutions including employment and wage rigidities, active labor market policies, labor immobility and market entry regulations. We distinguish between average and relative wage effects because (i) they have distinct implications for the wage structure, inequality and workers' welfare more broadly (see Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler, 2016) and (ii) there is a substantial difference in the two distributions of reported effects as we show in this paper. We then use a linear regression framework to relate the estimated wage effects and institutional coverage while controlling for an array of related characteristics. This type of meta-analysis is a research synthesis that attempts to extract useful conclusions from a body of diverse academic literature (see e.g., Card and Krueger, 1995; Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot, 2005; Card, Kluve, and Weber, 2018) . Importantly, we include region and decade fixed effects accounting for time-invariant differences across areas and aggregate shocks, country-specific economic conditions (as proxied by GDP growth and unemployment rate) and relative immigrant skill composition. Lastly, to eliminate potential concerns about our selection of estimates and studies we control for study characteristics and use various weighting schemes as robustness checks. Additionally, we can rule out that country-specific time-varying factors such as endogenous responses of institutions to immigration flows are driving our results.
Our main finding is that higher labor market rigidity, as brought about by more widespread institution coverage, has a positive impact on the relative wage effects of immigration on low-versus high-skilled 1 domestic workers and a weaker negative effect on the consequences on average earnings. Labor market policies are effective in dampening the extent to which foreign workers distort earnings differentials between high-and low-skilled natives while exacerbating any effect on average earnings. Intuitively, any policy meant to protect incumbent workers will also diminish potential benefits induced by the 1 We use the terms "low-" and "high-skilled workers" broadly. These could refer to employed individuals across various education/experience groups, occupations or even industries and the exact definitions vary across studies. For instance, the traditional skill-cell approach utilizes a constant elasticity of substitution heterogeneous labor framework and nests experience types within education groups (e.g., Borjas, 2003) . The relative wage effect in this model identify earnings distortions across experience groups within education types. See Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler (2016) for more details.
newcomers. These may include complementarities in the production process , productivity spillovers (Hunt, 2017) and skill or occupational upgrading (Foged and Peri, 2015) , etc.
The findings suggest that the significant variation in institutional coverage across countries may, at least partially, drive the substantial diversity of reported elasticities in the literature.
We advance the literature on the labor market effects of immigration by building on existing studies and providing novel insights on the role of institutions in mediating the competition between native and foreign workers. In doing so, this paper presents the first comprehensive analysis of the synergies between a wide range of labor market policies and the wage consequences of immigrants, filling in an important gap in an otherwise large and mature body of literature. Consistent with the previous evidence, we find that labor market rigidity exacerbates the effect of immigrants on the average wage earner. Extending this analysis, we are the first to show that institutions and policies are helpful in mitigating immigration-induced wage distortions among various native skill types. Although several important recent studies have strayed away from the classic perfect competition framework and begun analyzing the role of individual institutions, a thorough analysis has so far been elusive. Because the influence of institutions on relative wage effects are more relevant empirically and because institutions have a stronger effect on relative wages, our novel finding suggests that labor market institutions may be an effective tool in smoothing the economic absorption of foreign workers.
Crucial for our analysis is the reliance on previous studies in the literature. In a series of influential meta-analyses on the labor market effects of immigration, Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot (2010a; 2008b; 2008a; show that the estimated elasticities in the U.S. tend to be smaller in absolute value than in Europe. The authors speculate this disparity may stem from differences in labor mobility and/or labor market institutions but do not analyze this hypothesis in detail. Perhaps most similar to our study is the paper by Angrist and Kugler (2003) who use the Bosnian wars as quasi-experiments to analyze the interaction of institutions and employment losses induced by labor supply shocks. Reduced market flexibility (as measured by higher firing costs, replacement rates and barriers to entry) is associated with increased employment losses brought by foreign workers while wage consequences are not analyzed.
Next, Brücker et al. (2014) use a highly structural wage-setting approach to study the immigration earnings effects in three European countries -Denmark, Germany and the U.K. They find a significant role for wage flexibility in determining its magnitude, but do not identify the effect of particular institutions or policies. Lastly, Edo and Rapoport (2017) document an interesting interaction whereby a lower minimum wage exacerbates the immigration-induced earnings and employment consequences in the U.S.
A common theme among these studies is the significant role of institutional structure in altering the competition forces between incumbent workers and newcomers. Our paper builds on and extends this body of work, distinguishing between average and relative wage effects of immigration, analyzing a wide variety of labor market institution types simultaneously and employing a strictly data-driven approach.
Consistent with these earlier studies, we show that reduced labor market flexibility is associated with higher average wage losses due to immigration. In addition and novel to the literature, we go one step further to document that labor market rigidities mitigate relative wage distortions between low-and high-skilled natives. For recent reviews of the broader literature of the labor market consequences of immigration on domestic economies see NAS (2017), Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler (2016) , and Lewis and Peri (2015) .
We continue in Section 2 where we describe and summarize the data we use. Next, in Section 3 we briefly discuss how the institutional variables we analyze fit in the theoretical framework in the literature on the labor market effects of immigration. Section 4 lays out our empirical strategy and the equation we estimate. Lastly, we present our results in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
Data
We combine two data sources -a database on the impacts of foreign workers and information on institutional coverage from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). We now describe and summarize each one in turn.
Wage Impacts of Immigration

Data Sources and Sample
Building a database on the labor market effects of immigration requires selecting study inclusion criteria based on a few key priorities. With the goal of studying institutions, we focused on sampling studies analyzing a wide variety of labor market settings across the developed world. This included both geographic and temporal variation. Moreover, to ensure study (and therefore data) quality, we relied on high quality peer-reviewed publications. Lastly, we concentrated exclusively on estimates of the wage effects of immigration as this has been the main focus in the literature. 2 Appendix Section A.1 describes 2 Analyzing employment effects estimates is more problematic for a few reasons. First, there is large discrepancy in the outcome variable across studies -some use employment and some unemployment; some use (un)employment to population ratios and some do (un)employment rates. A comprehensive analysis will therefore require an implicit assumption on the effect of immigration on labor force participation, which we are not comfortable making. Second, there are far fewer migrationinduced employment impact estimates in the literature, introducing severe statistical power difficulties. To this end we point interested readers to Angrist and Kugler (2003) who analyze the interplay between labor market institutions and migrationinduced employment losses in the European Economic Area but did not study wage effects. in greater detail the paper sampling process along with the inclusion criteria and Australia. Additionally, when available, we recorded data on the corresponding standard error and tstatistic associated with the null hypothesis of the true effect equals zero, regression specification, sample (e.g., gender, education level), empirical approach (area, skill cell or mixture) 3 , publication outlet and estimation method (OLS, IV or simulation). To gauge study quality, we included journal impact factors measured by IDEAS/RePEc (2018), a widely used index.
An important feature of our subsequent analysis is the distinction between effects on the relative versus average wages. We make this choice due to (i) the considerable difference between the two and (ii) the significant disparity in reported semi-elasticities along this dimension (more on this below; see Table 1 and Figure A .1) . The latter presents immigration-induced total changes in the average labor market wage. The former one instead identifies relative wage effects, typically across experience or education groups while controlling for the overall impact. Hence, they capture a partial effect on wage differentials and are generally linked to changes in the earnings structure and wage inequality. These relative effects do not necessarily result in changes in total average earnings as a negative wage effect on one group may be offset by a positive one for other groups.
We follow Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler (2016) in classifying effect sizes into estimating average (the spatial approach) or relative wage changes (the national skill-cell and the mixture approaches).
Our broad definition of the skill-cell approach includes studies utilizing variation in immigration exposure across occupations (e.g, , industries (e.g, Bratsberg and Raaum, 2012) , or the classical education-experience cells (e.g, Borjas, 2003) . 4 We categorize combinations of those with geographic areas as the mixture approach (e.g, Card, 2001) . Lastly, studies using only geographic variation in immigration intensity are flagged as estimating effects on average wages (Altonji and Card, 1991) .
See Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler (2016) for more details on each empirical approach and the parameters they identify. Differences in regression specifications across studies require a few adjustments to ensure the re-ported estimates are measured in comparable units. First, some researchers publish elasticities while others estimate semi-elasticities. The distinction is subtle but important. The former measure the percentage change in natives' wages induced by a percent increase in immigration while the latter do the same for a percentage point increase in foreign-born workers. Following Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot (2005), we convert all elasticities to semi-elasticities since this is the more commonly used metric in the literature. Second, the wage effects are sometimes reported for the actual growth in immigration. This is often done in structural models where the simulation is carried out for the actual change in the immigrant share in the analysis period. In that case, we simply rescale the parameter to reflect a one percentage point increase in the proportion of foreign-born. Hence, our estimates are interpreted as the percentage change in wages for one percentage point increase in immigrants as a share of the labor force. The
Online Data Appendix contains a complete description of the operations and technical details involved in creating comparable estimates across studies.
While we attempt to do our best effort in assuring comparability across studies, an inherent limitation of the meta-analysis approach is the inevitable differences across samples and regression specifications for which we cannot account. For instance, included control variables or fixed effects across studies are rarely exactly identical. The sample definitions vary as well -e.g., 16-65 versus 21-54 years old, working age population versus labor force, etc. We have no reason to believe these remaining differences may systematically bias our results in a certain direction. Furthermore, it is reassuring that our results are robust to using various weighting schemes, subsamples and control variables. Hence, they seem to reflect fundamental patterns in the data rather than being an artifact of a few study characteristics or estimates.
A key concern for every meta-analysis study is the extent to which the sample of estimates is representative of the entire population. It is well-known that, all else equal, studies with statistically significant estimates are more likely to be published in academic outlets. Unfortunately, this fact introduces an inherent bias towards more significant estimates even in a random sample of published studies. However, under the assumption that authors choose the significant results as their preferred specification, all other reported semi-elasticities in their papers should be less prone to publication bias. We mitigate publication bias concerns to some degree by including all reported elasticities.
To directly test whether such bias may be present in our sample, we follow the standard practice in the literature (e.g., Card and Krueger, 1995; Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot, 2005; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2014 ) and run a regression of effect sizes on the standard error and other characteristics. If publication bias is not an issue, the coefficient on the standard error variable should be statistically in-distinguishable from zero. The results are presented in Appendix Table A. 2, using a different weighting scheme in each column. The weights are chosen to mirror our specifications in the main analysis and are described in Section 4.2. In Panel A (B) we present the regression results on our subsample of relative (average) wage effects. We find no conclusive evidence on publication bias in the sample of average effect sizes (Panel B). Some specifications show a positive and some show a negative association between estimated standard errors and effect sizes but this seem to driven by a few studies with many noisy estimates. The association disappears if we either weight studies equally, or assign higher weight to more precise estimates, better published studies or a combination (our preferred specification). We find some evidence that very noisy relative effects are more likely to be published if the estimate is negative (Panel A). However, this potential issue disappears once we weight by precision, accounting for noise in the study.
Overall, we find no evidence of publication bias in our preferred specification while the results for other specifications are mixed. Large outliers can skew the regression coefficients but our weighting scheme accounting for noise mitigates their influence. Further indication that such bias is not large in our sample comes from the apparent symmetry around zero of the histograms in Figures A.1 described below. Lastly, note that for the purpose of this study, publication bias, even if present, is only problematic if it correlates with the institutional variables we describe below. We have no particular reason to believe this is the case. We now move on to summarizing our sample of effect sizes. Table 1 presents some summary statistics, splitting the sample into relative (Panel A) and average (Panel B) wage impact estimates. Each column shows a different statistic denoted in the header. The first row shows information on our entire sample of 1,548 estimates, divided into 1,092 estimated relative wage impacts and 456 estimated average wage impacts.
Summary Statistics
The estimated impacts on average wages are small but positive and the effects on relative wages are slightly larger in magnitude and always negative. This pattern holds for both the mean and the median and across alternative weighting schemes (see Appendix Table A. 3). A one percentage point increase in the share of foreign workers, on average, lowers the wage of unskilled workers by 0.28 percent relative to the wage of skilled workers, ceteris paribus (Panel A). The same influx is associated with a 0.15 percent increase in the average labor market wages (Panel B). In other words, foreign workers assert much stronger pressure on the relative earnings between skill groups than on the average native. This is an interesting finding which has not been thoroughly documented in previous summaries of the literature.
It is indeed the prediction of the canonical heterogeneous labor model in which immigration-induced distortions in relative skill supplies change the relative earnings differential while the overall effect is close to null. This result further motivates our distinct treatment of the two types of semi-elasticities in the regression analysis. The pooled mean (median) in our sample (not shown here) of previously estimated semi-elasticities is −0.15 (−0.03) which is very close to the −0.12 (−0.04) reported in Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot (2005) based on a smaller sample of 345 effect sizes from 18 papers. In Appendix Figure A .1 we present densities for relative (black dashed border line) and average (light gray solid fill) wage elasticities, respectively. The entire distribution of relative effects is shifted to the left compared to the distribution of average effects.
We continue by discussing the distribution of effect sizes across study characteristics after which we move on to comment on the magnitude. The next four rows break down the sample by region. More than half of our estimates (921 from 38 distinct papers) are from European countries and a third are from North America (559 from 23 articles). In the following rows we split the semi-elasticities by estimation method. 766 of them are estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS) and 408 via an instrumental variable (IV) strategy. The latter are designed to correct for the inherent endogeneity stemming from the nonrandom location choices of foreign-born workers. 382 semi-elasticities are derived from simulating structural labor demand models. 5 Next, we summarize the effects on natives by skill group. We have 885 estimated semi-elasticities for the entire population and 315 (356) for high-(low-)skilled native workers only. 6 In the next two rows we divide our sample into estimates of short-versus long-run immigration effects as proxied by the frequency of the underlying data (annual or more frequent versus less frequent, such as decennial). Lastly, we show the distribution of estimates by publication status -Top 50 outlets as measured by RePEc's database versus the rest of the sample. 639 of our estimates come from these elite peer-reviewed journals and 917 are from other high-quality outlets.
We find several robust patterns worth noting. Relative wage effects follow similar patterns to the estimates reported in Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot (2010a, 2005) while average wage effects seem to move in the opposite direction in a number of dimensions. First, Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot find that the estimated semi-elasticities are smaller in the U.S. than in Europe. We find the same for relative wage effects but the opposite pattern for average wage effects such that the largest effect on wage levels is found in North America. Given the disparities in labor market institutions between the two regions, this is a first direct hint that labor market policies and features may play a role in affecting these estimates.
Second, IV estimates of relative wage impacts (-0.80) are more negative than OLS ones (-0.15), possibly reflecting corrected endogeneity stemming from immigrants' location choices in the direction we expect. Namely, that they locate in booming labor markets with higher wages. Third, consistent with Longhi, Nijkamp, and Poot (2005) we find that impacts on low-skilled natives (-0.61) are more adverse than on their high skilled counterparts (0.50). A possible explanation is stronger competition for jobs in the bottom of the wage distribution and spillover effects induced by innovation and patents, relevant for high skill natives. However, average wages increase more for the low skilled.
In addition to Longhi and coauthors' findings we document three new patterns in the full sample of wage effect sizes. The average wage effect is larger in the long run (0.30) than in the short run (0.08) and the distributional effects are slightly smaller in magnitude in the long run (-0.27) than in the short run (-0.28) as measured by yearly or more frequent data. This pattern is expected as adjustment mechanisms such as capital accumulation and technology adoption will not be present in the short run but will likely play a role in longer time frames. Next, the median relative wage impact estimates are generally smaller in magnitude than the means, indicating the presence of negative outliers skewing the overall distribution. Lastly, estimates in top publications are generally larger in magnitude than those published in journals outside top 50.
Labor Market Institutions Coverage 2.2.1 Data Source
We collected country-level information on institutional structure and strength from OECD (2018) . This data covers all members of the OECD which are a destination to the vast majority of economic immigrants across the globe (Peri, 2016) . We selected several variables with extensive coverage reflecting a wide range of institutions related to the labor market. We then merged these data to our sample of estimates by the first year of study sample. If the institution variable was missing for this year, we allowed a gap of up to five years. 7 With this procedure we merged 91 percent of our semi-elasticity estimates to at least one of the five institutional variables shown in Table 2 leaving us with a sample of between 628 and 1,323 effect sizes depending on the OECD variable considered. More details and information on the OECD variables, the merge rate with our sample of estimates, and the entire database are available in the Online Data Appendix.
Variable Description and Summary Statistics
We include data on five distinct institutional variables which we list and describe in detail below. Table   2 presents the coverage and summary statistics for each one. Each row denotes a separate country and each Panel designates a distinct institutional variable. Note that the sample size here refers to the number of merged country-year observations, not semi-elasticities. The latter is larger since each country-year observation can be matched to more than one semi-elasticity.
Employment Rigidity (StrictEmpInd): We use a strictness of employment protection legislation index which evaluates the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individual workers on regular contracts. Higher values correspond to a larger degree of strictness and therefore higher employment security/rigidity among incumbent workers. Panel A of Table 2 shows summary statistics on this variable.
The data covers most of the countries in our sample with rich variation across and little to no variation within each one (as denoted in the S.d. column). Unsurprisingly, the U.S. and the U.K. have the most flexibility (0.26, and 1.16 respectively), while employees are most protected in Portugal (5.00), the Netherlands (2.84), Sweden and Greece (2.80). We are able to link 47 unique country-year level observations to our database of wage impacts. 8 Wage Rigidity (CollBarg): We measure wage rigidity by the collective bargaining coverage ratethe ratio of the number of employees covered by collective agreements, divided by all wage earners with right to bargaining. As such, it is a direct measure of wage rigidity in the labor market commonly used in the literature (e.g., Avouyi-Dovi, Fougère, and Gautier, 2013) . Panel B presents some summary statistics on this variable. European countries are covered at much higher rates (e.g., 98% in Austria and 91% in Sweden) than the U.S. and Canada (24% and 34% respectively) and the average is 62%.
We acknowledge the heterogeneity of collective bargaining agreements across countries or even within countries across industries which, to some degree, may be a limitation of our analysis. Nevertheless, we believe our results will speak about an overall effect of wage ridigities which is still informative and relevant and better captured by this variable. The match rate is slightly improved relative to the previous Panel as we link wage impact data to 53 unique country-year observations of the wage rigidity indicator. 9 8 Alternative measures of employment protection are available in the OECD data. In a robustness checks we use a variable measuring employment protection for individual workers on temporary contracts (StrictEmpTemp). Two other variables measuring individual and collective dismissals are not used due to much lower coverage and weaker similarity with our main measure of employment ridigity. 9 An alternative and related measure of wage rigidity is trade union density. We prefer collective bargaining coverage be- Business Regulation (StateControl): This index measures the degree to which business enterprises are covered by formal regulations that inhibit or promote competition in the product market. It differs from the aforementioned institutions and ridigities measures as it affects the labor market indirectly through the regulations in the product market. Table 2 shows the index takes on lowest value in the U.K.
(1.42) and highest in Greece (4.24) displaying wide disparities across states. This is our institutional variable with poorest coverage -we merge only 13 unique country-year observations to our database. 11
Overall, Table 2 asserts the notion that policies and institutions are generally determined at the national level which motivated our cross-country perspective. Unsurprisingly, we see that labor markets in North America and the U.K. are characterized by lower rigidities and weaker incumbent protection as compared to European countries. In addition, we also use information on country-level GDP growth, unemployment rates and the relative skill distribution of immigrants and natives from the OECD and study characteristics such as estimation method and data frequency which we include as control variables.
cause it better captures the actual share of the labor force covered by collective agreements. Trade union density (membership) is misleadingly low for some countries with high wage rigidity -e.g., 98 percent of workers in France are covered by collective agreements but less than 10 percent are members of a union. 10 The data source for the U.S. is the Job Tenure Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the sample used to calculate it is all people age 16-64 in the labor force. 11 The alternative measures at our disposal have the exact same coverage and measure different barriers to entrepreneurship (BTE) and barriers to trade and investment (BTTI). We include them in our robustness checks.
Theoretical Considerations
Before proceeding to the empirical section, it is useful to briefly discuss the ways these labor market institutions play out in the canonical model of labor supply and labor demand used to study the impacts of immigration on native workers. The main theoretical apparatus in the literature is a neoclassical model, featuring a perfectly competitive economy with no institutional frictions or remedies. On the demand side, capital and heterogeneous labor, aggregated in a constant elasticity of substitution framework, are combined to produce a single good with constant returns to scale. In equilibrium all markets clear.
The model mechanically predicts relative wage changes mirroring relative supply distortions induced by foreign workers. For instance, an influx of low-skilled immigrants makes low-skilled labor relatively more abundant, decreasing its productivity and therefore price relative to high-skilled natives.
Average wages depend only on the elasticity of capital supply. 12 Fixed capital drives down labor's total productivity as immigrants come in and average wages decline while they remain unchanged if capital is fully flexible. Elastic capital supply is probably the most accurate assumption even for very short time horizons because immigration is generally a slow process where firms have time to adjust in response. This argument is especially relevant in open economies where investments can come in from abroad whenever there is an excess return to be earned. Table 1 shows that average wage effects are slightly positive even in the short run (annual or more frequent data) and higher in the long run (less frequent data). Positive total effects could reflect a more efficient allocation of workers to tasks, skill upgrading, productivity spillovers and demand-side effects. 13 Contrary to the neoclassical model, real world labor markets do not always clear. On the one hand, this could be due to distortionary institutions such as minimum wages and employment protection. 14 On the other hand, well-designed policies could reduce market imperfections such as search frictions and imperfect information. For instance, ALMPs such as job centers and training programs for unemployed are indeed meant to improve matching between workers and firms and help unemployed workers upgrade their skills and redirect their career towards firms and industries with better employment prospects.
Our institutional variables (Employment Rigidity, Wage Rigidity, Labor Immobility, ALMP spending, and Business Regulation) are defined such that higher values indicate stronger institutions and lower 12 Capital is assumed to be skill neutral and therefore does not affect relative wages. See Lewis (2013) for a discussion of models with capital-skill complementarity. 13 These adjustments are beyond the canonical model where each worker type is preassigned to one task, has a predetermined skill level, has no effect on the productivity of other workers beyond simple complementarities and where immigrants are workers (not consumers).
14 Angrist and Kugler (2003) set up a model in which firing costs protect incumbent workers in the short run but decrease equilibrium employment. occupational mobility likely deteriorating the total effect of immigration on native wages through the distortionary effects of rigidities and public spending. This is especially the case if immigrants are not covered by the institutional protections, making them more attractive to firms relative to incumbent workers. 15 Several problems arise in attempting to generalize the impact of labor market institutions on the relative wage effects of foreign workers. First, especially because institutional coverage and strength likely vary across skill groups, we need a model where workers respond differently to wage changes.
Heterogeneous labor supply elasticities imply that relative wage and relative employment effects can be of opposite signs. Moreover, the relative wage of low-skilled natives could even increase in response to low-skilled immigration if the former is sufficiently elastic, a phenomenon termed "perverse effects"
by Dustmann, Schönberg, and Stuhler (2016) . Hence, the mere effect of institutions on (heterogeneous) workers' labor supply makes it impossible to sign the interplay between institutions and relative wages in the economy. Second, institutions likely influence the elasticity of labor demand in heterogeneous ways across workers also due to varying coverage and strength. Third, many policies and regulations have different implications for the short and the long run (as in Angrist and Kugler, 2003) . Institutions in the form of various rigidities and high costs of job mobility likely prolong transitions and convergence to new equilibrium levels. 16 Empirically it is usually not possible to separate short and long run outcomes because immigration is generally a slow and gradual process.
To sum up, the main workhorse model used by most researchers assumes perfectly competitive markets and ignores the role of labor market institutions. They, however, could affect labor supply, labor demand as well as the size of the distortion in heterogeneous ways across skill groups and time horizons, making it virtually impossible to sign the effect on relative wages. Nevertheless, to the extend that stronger institutions are associated with larger frictions we expect that they worsen the effect on average wages. We thus conclude that an empirical approach is required to fully understand the interactions between labor market policies and the wage consequences of foreign-born workers.
Empirical Strategy
Regression Equation
We estimate the following equation:
15 See e.g. Angrist and Kugler (2003) where costs of firing (Employment Protection) is born solely by incumbent workers thereby harming their long run outcomes. 16 Note, no adjustment costs prevent the economy from jumping from one equilibrium to the other in the neoclassical model.
The subscripts i, c and t refer to effect size, country and time period, respectively. The outcome variable y ict is the estimated immigration wage effect, and institution ct is an institutional variable of interest 17 X ct includes GDP growth and unemployment to control for local economic conditions affecting labor market tightness and institutional structure. These variables account, for instance, for situations in which economic booms absorb foreign workers more smoothly and spur lower institutional coverage such as ALMP spending. Finally, the vector X ct also contains a variable measuring the relative skill distribution of immigrants and natives defined as low skilled share of all immigrants over low skilled share of all natives. It controls for the possibility that countries with, say, higher labor market rigidity may have more restrictive immigration policies. This may, in turn, lead to relatively fewer low-skilled workers and hence smaller wage impacts when natives are relatively skilled.
The vector Z i contains study/semi-elasticity characteristics such as data frequency, estimation method, and the skills of natives. The term δ t is decade fixed effects accounting for worldwide differences across time periods and λ r is a vector of region dummies for Nordic countries, the rest of Europe and the rest of the world, excluding North America which is the reference group. Lastly, ε ict is an idiosyncratic mean-zero error term.
The coefficient of interest is β. We estimate this equation with weighted OLS (see the next Subsection) separately for average and relative wage effects. The standard errors are clustered by country but do not account for the fact that our outcome variable is already estimated (as in Card, Kluve, and Weber, 2018) .In an ideal scenario, we would like to estimate the interaction between the wage returns to immigration and institutional coverage within countries. Nevertheless, given that institutions are set at the country level, this relationship will mainly be identified from cross-country variation within regions (while controlling for local economic conditions, X ct ). This is perhaps a limitation but we believe it is the closest we can get to causality without wiping out the useful part of the variation in the data.
Weighting Schemes
The sheer differences across studies raise the question of how much importance to place on each effect
size. For instance, should the semi-elasticities from a paper reporting only five estimates receive equal weights to ones derived from a paper with 30? Similarly, should articles published in the top academic journals, which have undergone more rigorous review process and are supposedly of higher quality, be weighted similarly to ones from lower ranked outlets? Lastly, one can argue that more precisely estimated semi-elasticities should also be given higher importance as they contain less statistical noise.
To verify the robustness of our results and to account for discrepancies across studies we introduce several different weighting schemes. First, we assign each wage effect size an equal weight and we refer to this as unweighted results. Second, instead, we give equal weights to each article. This procedure uses the number of reported semi-elasticities per article as an inverse probability weight and, intuitively, it downweighs effect sizes coming from studies reporting many such semi-elasticities (see Appendix Third, we account for study quality by using journals' impact factors data from RePEc and utilizing the inverse of the score as a weight. We refer to this as estimates weighted by impact. The procedure assigns higher importance to estimates published in higher ranked journals. Fourth, we adjust for the precision of the included estimates by using the inverse of the standard error as weighting factor.
Weighting by impact factor (proxy for journal quality) leads to small modifications of the distributions while taking the statistical uncertainty into account leads to a large reduction of the mass in the tails and higher concentration of effect sizes around zero (see Appendix Figure A .1c and A.1d) . 92 percent of relative and 90 percent of average wage effects are now concentrated in the interval (−0.5, 0.5). Hence, weighting estimates by the inverse standard error penalizes noisily-measured entries and rewards more precise ones, minimizing the influence of effect sizes that are too large in magnitude to be informative on the plausible wage effect of immigration.
Finally, we construct a combined weight in which we multiply the three weighting factors. This measure gives higher importance to effect sizes (i) published in higher ranked outlets, (ii) which are more precisely estimated and (iii) come from papers with fewer published semi-elasticities. As such, it combines the virtues of all specifications and it is our preferred specification. We separately incorporate all these weighting schemes in estimating the regression equation. Table 3 factor, all signs in this row are negative, pointing to the same conclusion. Similarly, the third shows less labor mobility leads to worse average wage consequences of immigration. An increase in the average tenure by one year is associated with a lowered semi-elasticity of about 0.09-0.51. More prevalent active labor market policies seem to also be negatively associated with estimated wage impacts of immigration but the coefficients are not statistically significant. Lastly, we find mixed evidence that business regulation effects the wage consequences of foreign-born workers. 18 Overall, Table 3 shows that labor market rigidities exacerbate the average wage impacts of immigration while shielding from redistribution consequences caused by wage distortion between high-and low-skilled natives. This pattern holds across various different weighting factors. Furthermore, in Panel A of Appendix Table A .4 we show the interaction between relative wage impacts and institutions is also robust to excluding outliers (Column 2), excluding OLS estimates from studies that provide IV estimates (Column 3), focusing only on the "preferred" estimate (Column 4) and excluding study characteristics (Column 5). Hence, the relationship we describe is not correlated with study characteristics and persist across different subsamples of estimates. Panel B shows similar robustness checks for average effects.
Results
As in the main analysis, we find some evidence of a negative relationship between average wage impacts and institutional coverage but average wage impacts are less strongly related to institutions.
We also checked the sensitivity of our results to utilizing only the cross-sectional dimension for identifying the interaction between institutions and wage impacts of immigration (Column 6). These results eliminate important threats to identification such as the concern that immigrants could simultaneously affect institutions and macroeconomic conditions. Second and more importantly, institutions may respond directly to a surge in immigration introducing a reverse causality problem. To eliminate these concerns, we simply use the average value of each institutional variable in the country and show that our results survive this reduction in identifying variation. This is unsurprising since, as we show in Table   2 , the variation in institutional scope is driven by cross-country and not within-country differences. The
Online Appendix describes and presents a series of further robustness checks not discussed here. All these robustness tests are certainly reassuring as they inform us that no particular subset of studies or estimates drive our results.
Discussion
We measure a wide spectrum of labor market rigidities as brought about by more pervasive institutions, regulations and policies and investigate their role in intermediating the competition forces between na-18 This is also the institutional variable with poorest coverage.
tive and foreign workers. We consistently find that labor market institutions are effective in mitigating relative wage distortions caused by immigrants but mildly exacerbate effects on average wages. In other words, these policies are effective in shielding domestic economies from redistributional consequences and have modest adverse impacts for the average worker. Hence, we document an important role of institutions in explaining differences in labor market impacts of immigration across countries.
A discussion on the magnitude of the estimated coefficients is in order. Our preferred specification
shows that a one standard deviation increase in labor market rigidity is associated with a 0.16-0. Our main result entails three main implications. Institutions and policies can be adequate and useful tools in successfully absorbing foreign worker flows into the labor market. This implication is especially relevant to policymakers concerned with wage differentials between the low-and high-skilled native workforce in the age of globalization. Second, a thorough understanding of the interaction between institutions and wage effects is fundamental in generalizing the labor market impact of immigration from one country to another. Lastly, differences in labor market rigidities across states are important drivers of the large heterogeneity of estimates in the literature. Notes: Panels A and B show statistics for relative and average wages respectively. N denotes the number of estimates, and Studies is the number of studies. The total number of studies by subgroups exceeds the total number of studies in our database (66) since some studies report estimates for multiple subgroups and methods. Notes: Panel A and B contain summary statistics for relative and average wage effect sizes respectively. First column is based on the unweighted effect sizes. In the next four columns show summary statistics under different weighting schemes: by the inverse number of effect sizes extracted from each study (Studies), by the inverse journal score (Impact), by the inverse standard error (Precision) and lastly combining the three weights (Combined). 
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